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The conference will consist of three sessions. First, a group of HOPOS scholars will reflect on the institutional history of philosophy of science, exploring how journals, research centers, societies, departments, and funding agencies have shaped the discipline as we know it today. Next, a group of contemporary philosophers of science (prominent researchers, journal editors, society presidents, and research center directors) will reflect on the current status of the profession through a series of papers and round table conversations. Finally, a group of promising junior scholars will offer their vision of what philosophy of science could or should look like in the decades to come.
Confirmed Speakers
Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge), Holly Andersen (Simon Fraser University), Liam Kofi Bright (London School of Economics), Carl Craver (Washington University-St. Louis), Kathleen Creel (Northeastern University), Fons Dewulf (TiLPS, Tilburg University), Heather Douglas (Michigan State University), Stephan Hartmann (MCMP, LMU Munich), Joel Isaac (University of Chicago), Carole Lee (University of Washington), Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP, LMU Munich), Sabina Leonelli (University of Exeter), Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh), Michela Massimi (University of Edinburgh), Bennett McNulty (University of Minnesota), Wendy Parker (Virgina Tech), Lydia Patton (Virginia Tech), Angela Potochnik (University of Cincinatti), George Reisch (Independent scholar), Alan Richardson (University of British Columbia), Stéphanie Ruphy (ENS-University of Paris), Bryan Roberts (London School of Economics), Janet Stemwedel (San José State University), Thomas Uebel (University of Manchester), James Weatherall (UC Irvine)
Scientific Committee
Bas van Fraassen (Princeton University), Paul Hoyningen-Huene (Leibniz University Hannover), Philip Kitcher (Columbia University), Helen Longino (Stanford University), Deborah Mayo (Virginia Tech), Sandra Mitchell (University of Pittsburgh), Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna), Alison Wylie (University of British Columbia)
Evidence-Based Medicine Reconsidered
Conference Dates: April 5-6th, 2025
10th Floor Cathedral of Learning
Senior Visiting Fellow Conference by Carl HoeferThe evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement began in the 1980s, reached its peak perhaps in the 1990s, and has since then enjoyed the status of orthodoxy, despite many criticisms being raised among medical practitioners and researchers. Philosophers of medicine have frequently criticized EBM’s hierarchies and rigid precepts, especially the “gold standard” status of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). A pluralistic approach to evidence in medicine has been increasingly popular in recent years, in which mechanistic evidence and reasoning, observational studies of many kinds and RCTs are assessed for value on a case-by-case basis. But does this trend away from the EBM hierarchy go too far and risk the reintroduction of the same biased, motivated evidence-gathering practices that originally motivated the EBM movement? What light can recent experiences in medicine and public health (e.g., during the covid-19 pandemic) shed on these issues?
Evidence-Based Medicine Reconsidered
April 5, 2025 @ 8:00 am - April 6, 2025 @ 5:00 pm EDT
Senior Visiting Fellow Conference by Carl Hoefer
The evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement began in the 1980s, reached its peak perhaps in the 1990s, and has since then enjoyed the status of orthodoxy, despite many criticisms being raised among medical practitioners and researchers. Philosophers of medicine have frequently criticized EBM’s hierarchies and rigid precepts, especially the “gold standard” status of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). A pluralistic approach to evidence in medicine has been increasingly popular in recent years, in which mechanistic evidence and reasoning, observational studies of many kinds and RCTs are assessed for value on a case-by-case basis. But does this trend away from the EBM hierarchy go too far and risk the reintroduction of the same biased, motivated evidence-gathering practices that originally motivated the EBM movement? What light can recent experiences in medicine and public health (e.g., during the covid-19 pandemic) shed on these issues?
Call for Abstracts
We invite papers which address topics related to evidence in medicine, broadly speaking. These include, but are not limited to:
- Defenses (or criticisms) of the supposed superiority of RCTs over observational studies, mechanistic studies, modeling, and individual clinical judgment;
- Discussions of lessons that philosophy of medicine or EBM can learn from recent experiences;
- Papers offering theoretical discussions of procedures for integrating and evaluating evidence from different sources;
- The merits and limitations of emerging kinds of medical evidence, such as adaptive trials, so-called real-world evidence, precision or personalized medicine research, and big data research
- Evidence in diverse contexts, such as clinical practice, alternative healthcare, drug or device regulation, public health, and health policy.
Abstracts should be between 500-800 words long and should be sent by November 17th to: SVFC-2025@gmail.com
Pragmatism and Measurement: New Directions
Workshop Dates: March 15-16, 2025
Organizing Committee
- Sandra D. Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh, HPS
- Holly K. Andersen, Simon Fraser University, Philosophy
- Dana Matthiessen, University of Minnesota, Center for the Philosophy of Science
- Dzintra Ullis, University of Pittsburgh, HPS
Location: Center for Philosophy of Science, Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh
Measurement is a central activity in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. With increasing attention to scientific practice, there is renewed interest determining what contributes to the reliability of measurement, its accuracy, and precision. The epistemology and metaphysics of measurement raise fundamental questions about the relationship between scientific theories and models, human actions, and the natural world. These include:
1. The representational and informational character of measurements (What do they measure?)
2. The evaluation of measurement outcomes (How should we assess the validity or reliability of a measurement process?)
3. The objectivity of measurements (How is the measurement process guided by theory? How is it independent? What are the implications for the status of measurement as evidence?)
This workshop will explore how a philosophically pragmatist epistemology and metaphysics addresses these questions, and how pragmatist frameworks might transform our understanding of the character and constituents of successful scientific measurement.
Confirmed Keynote Speakers:
- Nancy Cartwright, UCSD and Durham
- Hasok Chang, University of Cambridge
- Eran Tal, McGill University