Synthese TC on minimal (anti-) metaphysics
Date/Time
5/31/2024
12:00 AM - 12:00 AM Eastern
12:00 AM - 12:00 AM Eastern
Event Type(s)
Call for Papers (Enter the SUBMISSION DEADLINE as the date above. Submit EVENT separately.)
Event Description
Extended deadline for submissions: May 31, 2024
Location
Atlantis
Details
Call for Papers: Synthese topical collection on minimal (anti-) metaphysics
Guest editors: Tobias Henschen (Cologne), Andreas Hüttemann (Cologne)
Topical Collection Description: The metaphysics of science debate is often characterized as dividing philosophers who endorse positions of “maximal” metaphysics and “maximal” anti-metaphysics: philosophers who believe and philosophers who refuse to believe that the content or practice of science is to be explained in terms of unobservable entities, that these entities exist independently of the content and practice of science, that explanations in terms of these entities are (approximately) true, and that we can come to know that these explanations are true, and the negation of this position. What often remains unnoticed is that the metaphysics of science debate has shifted: that the leading participants in the debate have moved toward more moderate positions – positions that can be referred to as positions of “minimal” metaphysics and “minimal” anti-metaphysics. Like maximal metaphysicians, minimal metaphysicians believe that the content or practice of science is to be explained in terms of unobservable entities (for instance, structure), and that these entities exist independently of the content and practice of science. But unlike maximal metaphysicians, minimal metaphysicians emphasize the fallibility of their positions and restrict their ontological commitments to some minimal set of entities. Like maximal anti-metaphysicians, minimal anti-metaphysicians believe that the content or practice of science is not to be explained in terms of unobservable entities that exist independently of the content or practice of science. But unlike maximal anti-metaphysicians, minimal anti-metaphysicians believe that the content or practice of science is to be explained in terms of phenomenal entities, or that scientific realism about observable entities needs to be extended to “unobservable” entities that (like subatomic particles) can be “observed” by our aided senses. The planned collection is supposed to describe the shift in the metaphysics of science debate by providing a forum for the various positions of minimal (anti-) metaphysics that have been defended more recently, for clarifications or elaborations of these positions, and for the arguments and methods that have been or can be employed in support or against these positions.
Appropriate topics for submission include
For further information, please contact Tobias Henschen (lead guest editor): tobias.henschen@uni-koeln.de
The deadline for submissions is 31 May 2024.
Submissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx
Tobias Henschen (tobias.henschen@uni-koeln.de), Andreas Hüttemann (ahuettem@uni-koeln.de)
Guest editors: Tobias Henschen (Cologne), Andreas Hüttemann (Cologne)
Topical Collection Description: The metaphysics of science debate is often characterized as dividing philosophers who endorse positions of “maximal” metaphysics and “maximal” anti-metaphysics: philosophers who believe and philosophers who refuse to believe that the content or practice of science is to be explained in terms of unobservable entities, that these entities exist independently of the content and practice of science, that explanations in terms of these entities are (approximately) true, and that we can come to know that these explanations are true, and the negation of this position. What often remains unnoticed is that the metaphysics of science debate has shifted: that the leading participants in the debate have moved toward more moderate positions – positions that can be referred to as positions of “minimal” metaphysics and “minimal” anti-metaphysics. Like maximal metaphysicians, minimal metaphysicians believe that the content or practice of science is to be explained in terms of unobservable entities (for instance, structure), and that these entities exist independently of the content and practice of science. But unlike maximal metaphysicians, minimal metaphysicians emphasize the fallibility of their positions and restrict their ontological commitments to some minimal set of entities. Like maximal anti-metaphysicians, minimal anti-metaphysicians believe that the content or practice of science is not to be explained in terms of unobservable entities that exist independently of the content or practice of science. But unlike maximal anti-metaphysicians, minimal anti-metaphysicians believe that the content or practice of science is to be explained in terms of phenomenal entities, or that scientific realism about observable entities needs to be extended to “unobservable” entities that (like subatomic particles) can be “observed” by our aided senses. The planned collection is supposed to describe the shift in the metaphysics of science debate by providing a forum for the various positions of minimal (anti-) metaphysics that have been defended more recently, for clarifications or elaborations of these positions, and for the arguments and methods that have been or can be employed in support or against these positions.
Appropriate topics for submission include
- presentations, clarifications, or elaborations of and
- arguments for or against
- ontic structural realism,
- pragmatism,
- conventionalism,
- neo-Kantianism,
- Super Humeanism
For further information, please contact Tobias Henschen (lead guest editor): tobias.henschen@uni-koeln.de
The deadline for submissions is 31 May 2024.
Submissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx
Tobias Henschen (tobias.henschen@uni-koeln.de), Andreas Hüttemann (ahuettem@uni-koeln.de)
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